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KECK CONSIDERED: A NEW DOCTRINAL
MODEL FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT
OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION
INTRODUCTION

Keck and Mithouard,1 which was decided by the European
Court of Justice2 (hereinafter the Court) on November 24, 1993,
has stirred great controversy. It has reshaped the judicial architecture of Article 303 of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community (hereinafter Article 30). Article 30 is the
comprehensive charter that guarantees the free movement of
goods within the European Union.
The case establishes a new standard that can be applied to
assess the autonomy of Community law4 as it relates to Member State competence. Keck 5 appears at first glance as a step
backward from the legal protections afforded intra-Community
trade because it limits the application of the fiercely pro-integrative rule in the Branntwein case (hereinafter Cassisde Dijon),6 which reinvigorated Article 30 and gave it startling new
breadth. The decision in Keck 7 is not free of ambiguity, but it
1 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
2 The European Court of Justice was created in 1951 by the Treaty of Paris
which established the European Coal and Steel Community, a predecessor of the
European Economic Community. The Court, which sits in Luxembourg, has fifteen Justices, one from each Member State. Justices are appointed for six-year
terms by the Member States, and are eligible for re-appointment. The Court's
function is prescribed in Articles 164-188 of the Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, as amended by the Treaty on European Union. The procedures and methods of the Court are based on the French civil law method.
3 TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25,
1957, art. 30, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC TREATY]; See also EC LEGISLATION (Nigel G. Foster ed., 4th ed., Blackstone Press 1993).
4 Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases 267 & 268/91.
5 Id.
6 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
7 Id.
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advances the development of Community law in three significant respects.
First, it rationalizes conflicting case law dealing with rules
concerning socially and culturally determined market circumstances cases, particularly those encompassing the sale of products.8
These conflicting cases, through erratic and
unpredictable application by National courts, can lead to a jurisprudence more at to "a Europe of bits and pieces" 9 than to a
vital federal structure. The Court's judgment acknowledges
that the inconsistent judgments referred to the Court from various national courts do not assist in building a coherent body of
law. Second, the Keck 10 decision seems to alleviate the difficulty of determining whether the rising number of Article 17711
(hereinafter Article 177) challenges are capable of hindering intra-Community trade. 12 Third, and most important, the Court's
ruling in Keck 13 preserves and advances the Court's central
function as guarantor of a vital Community legal order by providing for a more coherent development of the law, which in
turn enhances the international solidarity of the Union.

I. KECK14

AND THE CHALLENGE TO ARTICLE

30

The Court in Keck 15 was asked to consider, in an Article
177 reference from the French Criminal Court, 16 whether
French interdiction of resale at a loss is compatible with the
principle of the free movement of goods articulated in Article
s Id.
14.
9 See Deirdre Curtin, The Constitutional Structureof the Union:A Europe of
Bits and Pieces, 30 COMMON MKr. L. REV. 17 (1993).
10 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
11 EEC TRATY, supra note 3, art. 177.
12 Keck & Mithouard,Joined Cases 267 & 268/91.
13 Id.
14 Id.

15 Id.

16 The specific French Criminal Court being referred to is the Tribunal de
grande instance de Strasbourg. The French Criminal Court in Strasbourg referred
this case to the European Court of Justice under Article 177. The accused super-

market managers, Keck and Mithouard, were charged with violating Article 32 of
a French Ordinance No. 86/1243 dated December 1, 1986, which prohibited resale

at a loss. The French court asked the European Court of Justice to advise it on
whether or not the French interdiction of resale at a loss was compatible with
Community law.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/5

2

1995]

KECK CONSIDERED

30. The French court, in its Article 177 reference, gave scant
analysis of the extent to which the French law restricts, "directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community
trade"' v as mandated in the test established by the Court in the
case of Procureurdu Roi v. Dassonville.18 The reference indicated that the ordinance that the two accused supermarket
managers, Keck and Mithouard, were charged with violating
was one which prohibited resale at a loss, but exempted the
manufacturer, "who remained free to sell on the market... at a
price lower than cost." 19 The reference also stipulated that
French shopping centers located near country borders may suffer from foreign competitors who were not bound by the prohibition. 20 In response to the reference, the Court reiterated its
Dassonville21 formula. The Court also limited its Cassis de Dijon22 rule that any diversity between national laws is capable of
running afoul of Article 30, even in the absence of discrimination against imported products.
In Keck, 23 a French ordinance is interpreted concerning the
market circumstances of product sales, which has the potential
of depriving traders of a type of sales promotion. "But the question remains," the Court said, "whether such a possibility is sufficient to characterize the legislation in question as a measure
having equivalent effect to a quantitative restriction on imports."2 4 The Court rejected this interpretation of the French

law and considered it necessary to re-examine and clarify its
case law, "in view of the increasing tendency of traders to invoke Article 30 of the Treaty as a means of challenging any
rules whose effect is to limit their commercial freedom even
where such rules are not aimed at products from other Member
States." 25
Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R.
5.
18 Id.
19 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91 1 4(a), Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
4(b).
20 Id.
21 Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 837.
22 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Ftir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
23 Keck & Mithouard,Joined Cases 267 & 268/91.
24 Id. T 13.
14.
25 Keck & Mithouard,Joined Cases 267 & 268/91
17

837
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TowARD A COMMON MARKET: THE SCOPE AND Ln[rrs OF

ARTICLE 30

Article 30's guarantee of the free movement of goods, 26 conceived as a broad anti-protectionist charter, is perhaps the chief
mechanism employed by the Treaty to advance the economic
and social cohesion and solidarity among the Member States. 27
Article 30 is also the structural and doctrinal model for the
other "four freedoms" provided for in the Treaty: 28 the free
movement of persons, services, capital, and payments. This establishes Article 30 as the central jurisprudential impulse for
European interdependence. The brevity of Article 30 belies its
vigor. It simply states, "quantitative restrictions on imports
and all measures having equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions, be prohibited between Member
29
States."
The heart of the jurisprudence of Article 30 is the creation
of a common market among the Member States. The significance of this objective is acutely apparent from the prominent
position it occupies at the very beginning of the Treaty in Article 3,30 which describes the tasks of the treaty. Of the twenty
different Community activities described in Article 3,31 the first
three enumerated tasks aim at one objective, the creation of a
common market. 32 The first activity specified in Article 333 is
the elimination of customs duties, quantitative restrictions and
measures having equivalent effect; the creation of a common
commercial policy is the second, and creation of an internal
34
market is the third.
A common market, according to Kapteyn and Van
Themaat, is one in which
[e]very participant in the Community is free to invest, produce,
work, buy and sell, to supply or obtain services under conditions
26 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 6.
27 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 6.

28 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 3(c) & (g).
29 EEC TRATY, supra note 3.
30 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 3.
31 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art, 3.
32 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 3.
33 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 3.

34 EEC TREATY, supra note 3, art. 3.
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of competition which have not been artifically
distorted where
35
ever economic conditions are most favorable.
The Court affirmed this interpretation of Article 30 as the
vehicle for achieving this dynamic objective. In Commission v.
United Kingdom,36 the Court stated that
[tlhe Treaty, by establishing a common market and progressively
approximating the economic policies of the [M]ember [Sitates,
seeks to unite national markets in a single market having the
characteristics of a domestic market. 3 7
Therefore, a common market as envisioned by the Treaty
and as interpreted by the Court means a broad scope for the
right to free movement. This ensures that the resources of the
Community may be employed in the most economically efficient
manner. The pursuit of a truly barrier-free internal market
within the federal structure of the European Union 3s is pro39
pelled by the vision of the Italian economist Paolo Cecchini.
Cecchini's analysis of the benefits of a barrier-free internal market explains the zeal with which the Court interprets, applies
and enforces Article 30. Cecchini concluded that the Union's
gross domestic product would increase by seven percent 40 in the
41
absence of all barriers to trade, creating five-million new jobs.
Dassonville4 2 is an example of how bold judicial legislation
by the Court has transformed a spartan legal principle into a
35 P.J.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 78 (2d ed. 1989).
36 Case 207/83, Comm'n of the Eur. Communities v. U.K & N. Ir., 1985 E.C.R.

1201.
37

Id.

17.
The European Union, which represents a broadening and deepening of the
European Community, was formally created by the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, commonly called the TEU. The final TEU draft was approved by the
Maastricht European Council, signed on February 7, 1992, and became effective on
January 1, 1993. The provisions of the TEU, which amend the Treaty Establishing
the European Community, concern two general spheres, political union and economic and monetary union. New provisions of the TEU strengthen the rights that
attach to European citizenship. The TEU is seen as a decisive step in the direction
of the political integration of Europe and the creation of a federal state.
39 PAOLO CECCHINI, THE EUROPEAN CHALLENGE 1992: THE BENEFITS OF A SINGLE MARKET 2 (1988).
40 Id. at 102.
41 Id.
42 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R.
837 125.
38
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vital, flexible doctrine wide application. The sweeping Dassonville43 formula, which considers the effect of national measures that are capable of hindering trade is anchored to the
44
principle of market unity.
The Dassonville4 5 test applies its broad power by cutting
down a wide range of hindrances to the free movement of
goods 46 in two ways. First, the second element of the Article 30
definition, "measures having equivalent effect to quantitative
restrictions" 4 7 (hereinafter MEQRs),48 vastly amplifies the
49
scope of the formula. The preamble to Directive 70/50 EEC
defines MEQRs as, "laws, regulations, administrative provisions, administrative practices, and all instruments issuing
from a public authority including recommendations."5 0 The
Court held that a Member State violates Article 30 when it provides a legal remedy with which to challenge the marketing of
an imported product that infringes a patent when it does not
51
give similar relief against an offending domestic product.
The Irish Minister for Industry's "Buy Irish campaign" 52 to
promote the sale of Irish goods by designating Irish products
with a special 'Guaranteed Irish' symbol to indicate the local
Id.
"Id.
4.
45 Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 837.
46 The Treaty employs an expansive concept of "goods." See LAW OF THE EURoPEAN COMMuNITIES 100 (Lord Hailsham of St. Marylebone & David Vaughan eds.,
1986); Lord Hailsham notes that:
"The Court of Justice has considered that "goods" are products which can be
valued in money and which are capable, as such, of forming the subject of
commercial transactions. Thus the concept of "goods" extends even to waste
matter, and no goods or products fall outside the scope of articles 30 to 36 of
the treaty, no matter how important they may be to the needs of a member
state."
47 EEC TREATY, supra note 3.
48 MEQRs are 'measures having equivalent effect' in Article 30 of the Treaty.
49 1970 O.J. SPEC. ED. (L 13/29) 17.
50 Id.
51 Case 434/85, Allen & Hanburys Ltd. v. Generics (U.K.) Ltd., 1988 E.C.R.
1245.
52 The "Buy Irish Campaign" in Case 249/81, Comm'n v. Ir., 1982 E.C.R. 4005;
is described in the submission of the Agent for the European Commission to the
Court and in the Opinion of the Advocate General. The lack of success of the campaign was noted by the Court at 25 in its ruling:" .. . the advertising campaign
and the use of the 'Guaranteed Irish' symbol, have not had any significant success
in winning over the Irish products...."
43
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origin of the goods was held by the Court 53 to contravene Article
30 because it was designed to substitute domestic goods for imported ones, even though the campaign was conducted by a nongovernmental authority, the Irish Goods Council 54 (albeit with
public funds) and despite the fact that the campaign was a failure. 55 The efficacy of the campaign did not matter, only that the
campaign was designed to affect intra-Community trade by encouraging consumer prejudice in favor of domestic goods.
In addition, the Irish Souvenirs56 case is significant because it expresses the Court's fidelity to the concept of effet
utile.57 This concept is a well-established notion that the essential aim of Community law can be attained through a dynamic
interpretation that broadens the compass of the Treaty.
The Court endorsed the broadest possible view of Article
30's scope by rejecting the Irish Government's argument that
Article 30 only referred to binding measures emanating from a
public authority. 58 It was sufficient for the Court that the Irish
government assisted in and encouraged a national practice that
had the potential effect of a binding national restriction on foreign products.
In Commission v. United Kingdom, 59 the Court applied the
anti-discrimination principle at the heart of the Irish Souvenirs
case 60 in a more elusive fashion. The Court examined a British
law that required certain types of products to have a "clear and
53 Ir., 1982 E.C.R. at 4005.
54 Created on August 25, 1978, the Irish Goods Council was established to
promote the sale of Irish goods by uniting various industries to a common goal.
55 Ir., 1982 E.C.R. at 4005 25.
56 Id. at 4005.
57 The Court has developed principles for interpretation which are aimed at
discovering both the objective meaning of particular provisions within the context
of the entire document, as well as the subjective intent of the drafters of the
Treaty. Effet utile is the general principle of 'effectiveness,' the concept that Member States may not adopt measures that abridge or destroy the effectiveness of
Community rules. Since Article 30 is aimed at establishing the broadest possible
conditions for the free movement of goods within the Community, the principle of
effet utile commands that preference must be given to an interpretation of Community law that affords the widest possible scope of Article 30. In addition, adherence
to this principle also means that exceptions to Article 30 must be narrowly
construed.
58 Ir., 1982 E.C.R. at 4005.
59 Case 207/83, Comm'n v. U.K & N. Ir., 1985 E.C.R. 1201.
60 Ir., 1982 E.C.R. at 4005.

7

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 7:149

legible" 6 1 mark of their national origin. The regulation was indistinctly applicable, affecting imported and domestic products
alike. However, the Court found that the measure was non-discriminatory in form only, because it permitted the British consumer to exercise prejudice against foreign goods. 6 2 The Court's
reasoning relies on the debatable inference that British consumers would prefer German toasters over similar domestic
products. 6 3 The challenged regulation could not withstand Article 30 scrutiny because it had "the effect of slowing down economic interpenetration in the Community."64
The concept of MEQRs is not limited to national legislation,
the administrative regulation of official government agencies, or
the semi-official efforts of publicly subsidized but ostensibly private authorities. The legal status of a quasi-official entity does
not determine whether it is bound by the obligations of Article
30. Rather, the Court's decisions express that the nature of the
functions and powers exercised are what determines whether
the entities are bound by Article 30.
The holdings of private organizations, such as professional
societies, will not avoid Article 30 scrutiny if the entity in question exercises special powers that may affect trade between
Member States. In The Queen v. Royal PharmaceuticalSociety, 6 5 the Court observed that national legislation conferred a
special power that constituted an MEQR capable of affecting
trade within the meaning of Article 30.66 The aforementioned
legislation named the Royal Pharmaceutical Society6 7 as the
mandatory registrar in order to issue prescriptions under the
68
National Health Service.
U.K, 1985 E.C.R. at 1201 3.
U.K, 1985 E.C.R. at 1201 17.
63 U.K, 1985 E.C.R. at 1201
19.
64 U.K, 1985 E.C.R. at 1201 1 17.
65 Case 266 & 267/87, Queen v. Royal Pharmaceutical Soc'y of Gr. Brit., 1989
E.C.R. 1295.
61

62

66

Id. T 5.

The Royal Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain is the sole professional
body in which pharmacists must enroll in order to issue the prescriptions being
discussed in this article.
68 The National Health Service is the publicly financed national authority
that manages the delivery of general health care to citizens of the United
Kingdom.
67
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The second basis for the far reaching scope of the Dassonville6 9 formula is the low threshold required before an impact on interstate trade may be found.70 The Court affirmed in
Van de Haar7 l that the mere capability to actually or potentially, directly or indirectly hinder interstate trade is sufficient
to transgress Article 30.72
Thus, in Commission v. Germany,73 the Court held that the
Biersteuergesetz 74 partitioned the market in violation of the
Treaty because foreign brewers could not market a fermented
product made from any cereal other than barley under the
designation of "Bier." Beer not produced according to the
Reinheitsgebot 75 could be sold in Germany, but not with the
coveted "Bier." The Biersteuergesetz 76 did not overtly discriminate against foreign-produced beer, nor did it refer to foreign
brewers. It simply stipulated manufacturing criteria that indimarket by
rectly excluded foreign brewers from the German
77
goods.
domestic
for
preference
the
heightening
The broad Dassonville78 formula, which is concerned with
all the trading rules 79 of Member States,8 0 is tempered by a
vaguely defined rule of reason: in the absence of Community
rules in the relevant field, Member State measures that restrain unfair practices may be consistent with Community law
if reasonable.8 1 By avoiding any discussion of the exact nature
Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R.
5.
5.
70 Id.
71 Case 177 & 178/82, Officer Van Justitie v. Jan Van de Haar & I. Aveka de
Meern B.V., 1984 E.C.R. 1797.
14.
72 Id.
73 Case 178/84, Comm'n v. F.R.G., 1987 E.C.R. 1227.
74 The German beer purity law based on the original Reinheitsgebot, which
was first adopted in Bavaria in 1516 to control the use of additives in brewing.
75 F.R.G., 1987 E.C.R. at 1227.
69

837

76

Id.

Id.
Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R.
837 5.
79 Id.
5.
80 The Member States are Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France,
Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal,
Austria, Finland and Sweden.
81 Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 837 6.
77

78
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of this rule of reason,8 2 the Court refrains from granting any
unnecessary impetus to the residual national competence that
it nevertheless acknowledges in Dassonville.3 The lack of parameters in Dassonvilles4 on the rule of reason8 5 provides an
explanation for the troubling lack of consistency in the Court's
treatment of national measures regarding market circum86
stances and gives a logical force to the Court's attempt in Keck
to locate the outer borders of Article 30.87
In Cassis de Dijon,"" the Court crafted another exception to
Dassonville.8 9 The exception states that Member States which
have regulatory independence are subject to the requirements
of Community law:
Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of
the products in question must be accepted in so far as those provi82 See Lord Hailsham, supra note 46, at 119. Lord Hailsham describes the
rule of reason as:
[A] good example of the approach of the Court of Justice in filling gaps in the
structure of the EEC Treaty, pending the adoption of Community measures
in the field.... It has recognized that, in the absence of legislative guarantees at the Community level, certain interests or values which are in the
general interest may justify the refusal by a member state to permit goods
from another member state to be imported or sold within its territory....
Measures which it is sought to justify under the rule of reason must be applicable to domestic and imported products alike, although equal applicability on their face will not be conclusive. Further, such measures must be
proportionate and necessary to satisfy the needs of the interest which it is
sought to protect.
With regard to the rule of reason and the ambit of Article 30, Lord Hailsham
notes that:
There is some debate as to whether the rule of reason operates so as to
cut down the substantive scope of Article 30 itself or so as to accept the
national measures, notwithstanding the terms of Article 30, pending appropriate guarantees adopted at Community level for the interests or values
concerned. This latter approach is the better view, although the court has
not always been clear on this point and sometimes has given credence to the
former view.
83 Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R. at 837.
84 Id.
85 Supra note 82.
86 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
87 Id.
17.
88 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
89 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R.
837 5.
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sions may be recognized as being necessary in order to satisfy
mandatory requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairtransactions and the defence of the
ness of commercial
90
consumer.

Cassis de Dijon9 ' establishes that Article 30 applies to indistinct measures which are equally applicable to domestic and
imported goods. However, justified State rules will be permitted if they conform to a non-exclusive list of mandatory requirements.9 2 The Member State9 3 bears the burden of justifying a
rule that exerts a market-partitioning effect as necessary to satisfy certain legitimate national interests.
Commentators, such as Gormley, 9 4 believe that by follow-

ing Cassis de Dijon,9 5 the jurisprudential basis of Article 30 will
be firmly entrenched. The Dassonville96 test will intercept state
measures capable of hindering the free movement of goods, and
the CassiS9 7 principle will provide States with a narrow, judicially supervised discretion to protect vital national concerns. 98

III.

ARTICLE

30

AND THE MARKET CIRCUMSTANCES: CASE

LAw IN CHAOS

The issue in Keck 9 9 involved a French ordinance that affected the market circumstances in which the accused supermarket managers sold their products. It neither targeted
foreign competitors, nor compelled certain technical specifications for foreign-made goods sold at the supermarket. Furthermore, the safety, labeling or ingredients of such products were
not affected by the French ordinance. 100 Rather, the legislation
8.
91 Bundesmonoploverwaltung FIr Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. at 649.
2.
92 Id.
93 Supra note 80.
94 See Laurence W. Gormley, Actually or Potentially, Directly or Indirectly?
Obstacles to the Free Movement of Goods, 9 Y.E.L. 197 (1989).
90 Bundesmonopolverwaltung FiirBranntwein, 1979 E.C.R. at 649

95 Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. at 649.
96 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R.
837 4 5.
97 Bundesmonopolverwaltung FiirBranntwein, 1979 E.C.R. at 649.
98 See J. Steiner, Drawing The Line: Uses and Abuses of Article 30 EEC, 29
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 749, 753 (1992).
99 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
100 Id.
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was aimed at market behavior. By specifying manner of
business regulations in the marketplace, the French authorities
assumed the role of an arbiter between the supermarket and
other economic actors, the smaller businesses and
consumers.' 0 1
The confusing lack of consistency and clarity in Community
law arises from the fact that, prior to Keck,'10 2 some State measures relating to market circumstances did not fall within the
ambit of Article 30. Similarly, Article 30 often applied in other
cases, but the State measure was permitted based upon the
10 3
mandatory requirements contained in the Cassis de Dijon
judgment. When a State measure is justified on the grounds
that it conforms to a mandatory requirement, the national court
is required to determine whether the measure adopted is proportional to the end sought.
A comparison of these two types of cases presents an illustration of the analytic difficulty. In the Oebel 10 4 case, the Court
considered whether a German prohibition on baking and transporting bread at night offended Article 30.105 Mr. Oebel argued
that the German legislation restricted the export of German
10 6
baked goods to other countries, especially in border areas.
Mr. Oebel also asserted that the prohibition on night work distorted competition by preventing German bakers from arranging their production schedules in the most economically efficient
10 7
manner.
In rejecting Oebel's claim, the Court stated that the restriction on night production constitutes a legitimate element of
economic and social policy consistent with the objectives of public interest articulated in the Treaty.' 0 8 The Court noted that
Article 30 was not contravened because trade within the Community was still possible with the condition that delivery to consumers and retailers be restricted equally for all producers. 10 9
101 Id.
102

Id.

Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fir Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
104 Case 155/80, Summ. Proceedings Against Sergius Obel, 1981 E.C.R. 1993.
103

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Obel, 1981 E.C.R. at 1993

14.

108 Obel, 1981 E.C.R. at 1993
109 Obel, 1981 E.C.R. at 1993

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss1/5
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Similarly, in Quietlynn v. Southend-on-Sea BC,110 even
though goods from other Member States were subject to the
ban, the Court still determined that a British law barring the
sale of sex-related items from unlicensed establishments did not
violate Article 30.111 The challenged law was merely a rule re-

that ingarding their distribution. 112 The Court also observed
11 3
tra-Community trade was possible at all times.
Conversely, in the Blesgen 1 4 case, the Court rejected the
same argument which prevailed in Cassis de Dijon'1 5 three
years earlier. In this case, a Belgian cafd owner was prosecuted
for selling consumption spirits stronger than those allowed
under Articles 1, 2, and 14 of the Belgian Law of August 29,
1919, known as the Vandervelde Act. 1 6 This law was intended
to control the consumption of strong spirits by limiting their accessibility during certain hours."17 The defendant argued that
the Belgian law hindered intra-Community trade by restricting
the strong spirits produced in other Member States from reaching the Belgian market.""
Advocate-General Reischl's"1 9 distinction that the Belgian
prohibition did not involve marketing rules appears strained in
110 Case C-23/89, Quietlynn Ltd. and Brian James Richards v. Southend Borough Council, 1990 E.C.R. i.
111
112

113
114

Id.
Id. 1 9.
Quietlynn, 1990 E.C.R. at i 11.
Case 75/81, Joseph Henri Thomas Blesgen v. State of Belg., 1982 E.C.R.

1211.
115 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
116 The Vandervelde Act is articulated in the Belgian Law of August 29, 1919,
the Vandervelde Law. This Law was enacted to limit the accessibility of alcoholic
beverages. This was accomplished by imposing conditions on the retail sale of
these beverages.
4.
117 Blesgen, 1982 E.C.R. at 1211
3.
118 Blesgen, 1982 E.C.R. at 1211
119 The Advocate General is an officer of the Court. His or her role is to analyze the issues of Community law in each case and to present a public opinion to
the Court on the proper result under Community law. Opinions of the Advocate
General do not always correspond with the opinion of the Court. Opinions of the
Advocate General can be quite influential, and they often foreshadow the future
development of Community Law. Advocates General are usually legal scholars of
high regard or indeed former judges in their own country. There are nine Advocates General, who are appointed to the Court for six year terms. There is no
comparable judicial officer or procedure in the legal system of the United States.
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reasoning. 120 Reischl's analysis clearly illustrates the central
flaw of the Court's market circumstances jurisprudence prior to
Keck 12 1 which was the lack of a principled basis by which to
122
fashion a consistent doctrine.
Reischl contended that the rules regulating alcohol were
not marketing rules, but were rules regulating the use of
alcoholic beverages because they only barred the serving and
stocking of certain alcoholic drinks, and not their sale and
stocking.' 2 3 Consequently, the Belgian rules could not be considered MEQRs that offend Article 30. However, Reischl does
not explain how establishments can sell goods without engaging
in any form of marketing and his opinion does not attempt to
reconcile this apparent logical inconsistency.
Relying on the Court's judgment in Oebel, 124 Reischl stated
that since the Belgian law had no adverse effect on intra-Community trade, it was not protectionist and did not transgress
Article 30.125 The Court's judgment stated that the Belgian
26
prohibition had nothing to do with the importation of goods.1
The Court did find Article 30 to be applicable in the Oosthoek 12 7 case. As a sales promotion, Oosthoek 128 offered subscribers a small free gift based on the value of the purchase, a
practice that violated Dutch law. 12 9 The Court interpreting
Netherlands legislation ruled that the sale of encyclopedias produced in that country was not linked with intra-Community
trade and did not fall within the scope of Article 30.130 In contrast, the Court observed that the Netherlands law did oblige
Oosthoek to adopt different sales promotion schemes in differBlesgen, 1982 E.C.R. at 1211.
Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
122 Blesgen, 1982 E.C.R. at 1211.
120
121

123

Id.

Case 155/80, Summ. Proceedings Against Sergius Obel, 1981 E.C.R. 1993.
Blesgen, 1982 E.C.R. at 1211.
126 Id.
127 Case 286/81, Criminal Proceedings Against Oosthoek's Utigeversmaatschappij BV, 1982 E.C.R. 4575.
128 Oosthoek, a Dutch firm, marketed Dutch language encyclopedias throughout the Netherlands and in the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium.
129 The Dutch Law of 1977, Wet Beperking Cadeaustelsel, was the law on the
restriction of free gift schemes.
130 Oosthoek, 1982 E.C.R. at 4575 1 9.
124
125
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ent Member States, limiting intra-Community trade in encyclopedias and thus coming within the sphere of Article 30.131
In Cindtheque v. Federationdes Cindmas Franqaises,z3 2 the
influential opinion of Advocate-General Slynn 33 indicated the
contours of the standard which the Court would later adopt in
z3 5
Keck.- 3 4 Cindtheque, a video importer, relied on Dassonville
to challenge a French law136 which banned the selling or renting of film video-cassettes for a period of one year after the issuance of a performance certificate for the film in question. The
measure, justified as a form of cultural preservation, applied
equally to all trade in video-cassettes for the twelve-month period. Imported and domestic videos alike were barred from the
13 7
market.
The Court's ruling in Cindtheque138 is significant in several
respects. The Court heard the case in plenary session, indicating that it was dealing with a difficult and controversial interpretation of Article 30. The noteworthy opinion of AdvocateGeneral Slynn also illustrates the unique function of the Advocate-General in affecting the development of Community law.
The Advocate-General's role is derived from the French Cornmissairedu Gouvernement13 9 at the Conseil d'Etat, 40 who is to
act as "the embodied conscience of the Court," 14 ' a non-partisan
defender of justice. By proposing a new, principled solution to
market circumstances cases that attempts to channel Community law in a new direction while preserving the market integrating force of Article 30, Slynn's opinion affirms his keen
131 Oosthoek, 1982 E.C.R. at 4575

10.
Joined cases 60 & 61/84, Cinetheque SA and Others v. F6ddration nationales des cinemas frangais, 1986 E.C.R. 2605.
133 Supra note 119.
134 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
135 Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R.
837 5.
136 Cinetheque, 1986 E.C.R. at 2606.
137 Id.
138 Cinetheque, 1986 E.C.R. at 2605.
139 D. LASOK & J.W. BRIDGE, LAW INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 283 (1991).
140 Id.
141 C. HAMSON, THE EXECUTIrE DISCRETION AND JUDICIAL CONTROL, quoted in
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNITIES, 283 (D.Lasok & J.W.
Bridge eds., 1991).
132
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appreciation of the embodied conscience province of his office.
Slynn's advice to the Court in Cingtheque 42 also illustrates the
effective interplay of the three primary roles of the AdvocateGeneral. The Advocate-General is expected to propose a solution for the case presented to the Court; 1 43 to relate the proposed solution in the case at hand to the overall pattern of the
existing case law;'4 and to indicate, if possible, the future de14 5
velopment of the case law.
Advocate-General Slynn acknowledged that Article 30 ju146
risprudence "must inevitably develop on a case-by-case basis"
as different fact situations are continually presented to the
Court. The Advocate-General then proposed that although Article 30 "appears to be couched in absolute terms," 14 7 it cannot
be read to impose an absolute injunction.
On this premise, Slynn urged the Court to find, in the absence of discrimination against foreign products and protection
of the domestic market, that prima facie the measure does not
fall within Article 30 even if it does in fact lead to a restriction
or reduction of imports.14 8 Despite the simplicity and logical
force of this solution, the Court was not prepared to go as far in
charting a new course for Article 30 as Advocate-General Slynn
wanted. It found that the legislation being scrutinized did not
discriminate against foreign goods, but observed that an obstacle to intra-Community trade may be created because video-cassettes that may be lawfully sold in one Member State may not
be sold in France. 149 The Court found that this type of barrier
to trade is lawful provided that it is necessary to attain an objective justified under Community law.' 5 0 The Court also held
that the encouragement of films in cinemas as a priority over
other means of film distribution is compatible with the aims of
the public interest, more specifically the free movement of
goods, as stated in the Treaty. 15 ' The Court finally concluded
Cinetheque, 1986
D. LASOK & J.W.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Cinetheque, 1986
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Cinetheque, 1986
150 Cinetheque, 1986
151 Cinetheque, 1986
142
143
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BRIDGE, supra note 139, at 283.
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that the proportionality of the measure to the intended conse1 2
quence is a matter for the national court to decide.
In GB-INNO-BM v. Confdddration du commerce luxembourgeois,153 the Court found that legislation that restricts
or bans certain forms of advertising may restrict the volume of
trade because it affects marketing opportunities, although it
does not directly affect trade. 1 " As compared to the French supermarket managers in Keck, 155 who operated a retail business
near a border area, the Belgian company GB-INNO-BM56 operated supermarkets close to the Luxembourg border. The company distributed advertising leaflets in Luxembourg which
promoted the sale of retail goods at a temporarily reduced
price.' 57 The advertising complied with Belgian legislation relating to unfair competition, but not with the Grand Duchy's
rules which prohibited the offering of retail goods at temporarily reduced rates.' 58
Advocate-General Lenz, 159 stressing the general nature of
the prohibition against all MEQRs, stated that one could distinguish the national legislation at issue from other national legislation that might also affect intra-Community trade by
geographic proximity.160 According to his analysis, the Luxembourg regulations transgress Article 30 because they specifically affect the external trade of Belgium across the frontier;
conversely, the prohibition in Oebel'6 ' against night-time work
62
in bakeries does not affect external trade.'
In Torfaen Borough Council v. B&Q plc, 63 the Court considered whether a British Sunday trading law (The Shops
Act),' 6 4 which forbids the sale of certain items, 65 resulting in
152 Cinetheque, 1986 E.C.R. at 2605 26.
153 Case 362/88, GB-INNO-BM SA v. Confederation du Commerce Luxembourgeois Asbl., 1990 E.C.R. 1-667.
154

Id.

7.

165 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
156 GB-INNO-BM, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-667 2.
157 Id.
158 GB-INNO-BM, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-667 3.
159 Supra note 119.
6.
160 GB-INNO-BM, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-667
161 Case 155/80, Summ. Proceedings Against Sergius Obel, 1981 E.C.R. 1993.
162 Id.
163 Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q PLC, 1989 E.C.R. 3851.
164 Shops Act, 1950, 14 Geo. 6, ch. 28, § 47, sched. 5 (Eng.).
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reduced total weekly sales, could survive Article 30 scrutiny.
The Court found that the Sunday trading rules hindered trade,
and would only be acceptable if they could be justified. 166 The
application of the Torfaen 167 decision in the United Kingdom
was chaotic, because certain courts had taken the view that the
Shops Act was compatible with Article 30 while other courts
reached the opposite conclusion.'-6
The disparate outcomes of these cases show how difficult
they are to reconcile. Torfaen16 9 and GB-INNO-BM17 0 suggest
that some reduction in the volume of imports or sales of a particular product will offend Article 30. However, the regulations
in Oebell7 ' and Quietlynn 172 were also capable of causing reduction in the volume of imports. The Court's justification in
Oebel' 73 and Quietlynn 174 that trade between Member States
75
remained possible at all times was also applicable in Torfaen
and in GB-INNO-BM.17 6 The prohibition in Oebel 7 7 withstands Article 30 examination because it is aimed at improving
manifestly sensitive industry." 17 8 The
working conditions "in a1 79
"sensitive industry" test
introduced by the Court raises more
questions than it answers. One question raised is whether the
baking industry is a more sensitive industry than the retail industry that is challenged in GB-INNO-BM.i8 0 The Court offers
neither an explanation nor an objective standard for guidance.
The Court's judgment suggests the possibility that a Member
165

Id.

Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3851
167 Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3851.
166

1 13.

& PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAw 471-72 (1993).
169 Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3851.
170 Case 362/88, GB-INNO-BM SA v. Confederation du Commerce Luxembourgeois Asbl., 1991 E.C.R. 1-667.
171 Case 155/80, Sutum. Proceedings Against Sergius Obel, 1981 E.C.R. 1993.
172 Case C-23/89, Quietlynn Ltd. and Brian James Richards v. Southend Borough Council, 1990 E.C.R. at i, 1-3059.
173 Obel, 1981 E.C.R. at 1993.
174 Quietlynn, 1990 E.C.R. at 1-3059.
175 Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q PLC, 1989 E.C.R. 3851; see
generally Steiner, supra note 98, at 757.
176 Case 362/88, GB-INNO-BM SA v. Confederation du Commerce Luxembourgeois Asbl., 1990 E.C.R. 1-667.
177 Obel, 1981 E.C.R. at 1993.
178 Id. at 2008.
179 Id. 1 12.
180 GB-INNO-BM, 1991 E.C.R. at 1-667.
168 STEPHEN WEATHERILL
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State may raise the defense that an MEQR should pass Article
30 muster because it concerns a manifestly sensitive industry.
The judgments of these competing cases cannot be distilled
into a coherent legal principle or set of principles. This variety
of outcomes also illustrates that it was untenable for the Court
to attempt to craft logically consistent distinctions in market
circumstances cases. This is true even though Advocate-General Slynn argued in Cintheque'8 ' that this is precisely how
Community law develops.
These confusing, unpredictable results were a consequence
of the application of the two-part inquiry articulated in Cassis
de Dijon.182 According to this inquiry, the Court must first decide whether the ends established by the national measure are
mandatory and whether they promote objectives consistent
with Community law. When the objective is clearly framed, the
second inquiry stipulated in Cassis8 3 requires the national
court to assess whether the measure is proportional and
whether it goes only as far as necessary to achieve the objective.
Both elements of the Cassis 8 4 rule tend to increase the likelihood that the final result in the national courts will be unsatisfactory because it may be capable of more than one good-faith
interpretation.
A broad interpretation of Article 30, with regard to
8 5 of
mandatory requirements, invites a mechanical application
the Dassonville8 6 test, as Advocate-General Van Gerven 8 7 described in Torfaen.'88 Under this interpretation, the Court will
be confronted with "countless new mandatory requirements and
grounds of justification ....

National policy decisions would

constantly be submitted to it with a request to extend the list of
examples of mandatory requirements." 8 9 Van Gerven feared
181 Joined cases 60 & 61184, Cinetheque SA and Others v. Federation nationales des cinemas francais, 1986 E.C.R. 2605, 2611.
182 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
183 Id. 9114.

184

Id.

185

Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q PLC, 1989 E.C.R. 3851.
Case 8/74, Procureur du Roi v. Benoit & Gustave Dassonville, 1974 E.C.R.

186

837 1 5.
187

188
189

Supra note 119.
Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3879.
Id. at 3880.
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that such a constantly expanding list would "coincide with a
certain residual power of the Member States." 190
The application of the second Cassisl91element, the proportionality test, 192 also presents severe challenges for national
courts. It is the national courts that will be required to affirm
the reasonableness of the policy decisions of Member States,
Van Gerven noted, "where there is no question of direct or indirect, factual or legal discrimination against, or detriment to,
imported products."1 93 Steiner194 argues that because proportionality is a question of fact, to be decided on the evidence adduced, the outcome of each case will turn on the strength of the
evidence presented, resulting in an outcome which may vary
from case to case.195 This disparity in judicial outcome, which is
most disturbingly evident in the British Sunday trading decision, 196 presents a compelling argument that the Court must
craft a more principled rule that national courts can apply in a
more even-handed fashion.
Two SOLUTIONs To THE OVERREACH OF ARTICLE 30

IV.

In Torfaen,197 Advocate-General Van Gerven stated that
the case posed such a difficult inquiry relating to national measures that any further inquiries of this kind "should be avoided
as far as possible by interpreting Article 30 in accordance with
the intendment of the Treaty."198
Van Gerven proposed an economic solution, raising the
threshold which triggers Article 30.199 He derived a rule of application by distinguishing Cingtheque20 0 from Torfaen.201 In

Cindtheque,20 2 Van Gerven averred, the French law20 3 banning
190 Id.

191 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung FUr Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
192

Id.

193
194
195
196

Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3880.
Steiner, supra note 98, at 759.
Steiner, supra note 98, at 759.
Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3851.

197 Id.

198 Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3883.
199 Id.

200 Joined cases 60 & 61/84, Cinetheque SA and Others v. Federation nationales des cinemas francais, 1986 E.C.R. 2605.
201 Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3851.

202 Cinetheque, 1986 E.C.R. at 2605.
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video-cassettes had compartmentalized the French market,
screening it off from competition in other Member States. He
stated the appropriate place to look for guidance on market partitioning in the Treaty is Article 85,204 which deals with concerted practices that restrict or distort competition. Van
Gerven suggested that the principle that should be applied is
the principle contained in Article 85(1),205 which prohibits
agreements that make access to markets more difficult if it can
be demonstrated, on the basis of the whole legal and economic
context, that the agreement extends over the whole territory of
the Member State. 20 6 In a situation like Cintheque,20 7 Van
Gerven recognized that market integration was in jeopardy and
203

Id.

204 ARTICLE 85 OF THE EEC TREATY, supra note 3, at 32, states:

1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular
those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article
shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any
decision or category of decisions by associations of
undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are
not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
205

Id.

206

Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3877.
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Article 30 would be automatically applicable. 20 8 On the other
hand, he noted, the Sunday trading laws 20 9 in Torfaen2 10 were
only marginally relevant to intra-Community commerce and did
not pose a serious obstacle to the creation of a common
211
market.
Van Gerven's notion of a 'screening test' 2 12 is intellectually
appealing because it would appear to limit the application of
Article 30 to national measures hostile to market integration.
However, Van Gerven's proposed test is vague, with no clear
criteria for application. It does not suggest any criteria for deciding when market integration is threatened, nor does it recommend a threshold for the application of such criteria. The
Advocate General's opinion offers no guidance. Moreover, as
Steiner notes, 2 13 it may be a very difficult matter for the Court
to examine the entire national legal and economic context in order to determine whether a state measure that appears to partition a market is a prima facie breach of Article 30.
It is contended that "Van Gerven's solution puts excessive
demands on national courts."2 14 Relying on a French study,
Mortelmans notes that "if the European Court of Justice instructs national courts to follow economic criteria, such as those
relating to national price measures and EEC agriculture market regulations, the national courts fail to do so in a uniform
manner."215

2 16 is
The new standard established by the Court in Keck
quite similar to the legislative solution suggested by Eric
White. 2 1 7 White's rule of decision simply provides that indistinctly applicable national measures which regulate the circum207 Joined cases 60 & 61/84, Cinetheque SA and Others v. Federation nationales des cinemas francais, 1986 E.C.R. 2605.
208 Torfaen, 1989 E.C.R. at 3874.
209 Id. at 3851.

210
211
212

Id.
Id. at 3879.

Id. at 3874.
See Steiner, supra note 98, at 764.
214 Kamiel Mortelmans, Article 30 of the EEC Treaty and Legislation Relating
to Market Circumstances:Time to Consider a New Direction?, 28 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 127 (1991).
215 Id.
216 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
217 Eric White served as the Agent for the Commission in Torfaen.
213
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stances in which goods may be sold or used in a general and
neutral manner "are not incompatible with the objective of creating a unified market comparable to a domestic market and do
not fall under Article 30."218
The rule adopted by the Court in Keck, 21 9 which is similar
to White's proposed rule, will be much easier for national courts
to apply. Once the Court has determined that legislation regarding market circumstances, such as the French resale at loss
regulations or the British Sunday trading law, 220 does not fall

under Article 30, the national court does not have to refer the
case. This will promote certainty and clarity in commercial exchanges both within the Community and in individual Member
States. The Court will not be as burdened with the large
number of time-consuming Article 177 references, and can
spend its time dealing with serious threats to the single market,
such as import bans, 221 import licenses, 222 unnecessary customs
formalities, 223 delivery restrictions, 224 and regulations requiring preferential treatment of national products. 225 Article 30
will no longer be in danger of becoming "a busybody's charter
for attacking national measures in purely national situations
with scarcely the most tenuous link with intra-Community
trade. 22 6
CONCLUSION

There are perhaps more significant reasons for believing
that the Court has adopted the correct approach with respect to
market circumstances legislation in Keck. 22 7 First, the evidence

is compelling that, with respect to national legislation restrict218

Eric White, In Search Of The Limits To Article 30 Of The EEC Treaty, 26

COMMON MKT. L. REV. 259 (1989).

Keck & Mithouard, Joined Cases 267 & 268/91.
220 Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q PLC, 1989 E.C.R. 3851.
221 Case 2/73, Riseria Luigi Geddo v. Ente nazionale Risi, 1973 E.C.R. 865.
222 Joined Cases 51-54171, Intl Fruit Co. NV v. Produktschap voor Groenten en
Fruit, 1971 E.C.R. 1107.
223 Case 42/82, EC Conm'n v. Fr., 1982 E.C.R. 841.
224 Case 272/80, Frans-Nederlandse Maatschappij voor Biologische Producten
BV, 1981 E.C.R. 3277.
225 Case 13/78, Joh Eggers Sohn & Co. v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, 1978
E.C.R. 1935.
226 Gormley, supra note 94, at 197-99.
227 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
219
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ing or prohibiting certain selling arrangements, Article 30 jurisprudence in Member States had moved from theoretical
coherence to practical dysfunction. The Court did not explicitly
overrule Cassis,228 even though the Court's authority does not
derive principally from res judicata2 29 and it could easily have
done so. Instead, it modified the Cassis2 30 principle by reshaping it into a presumption that national marketing rules
must be shown to have a discriminatory effect before the Court
will find that such rules violate the Treaty.2 3 1 The Keck 2 32 judgment creates, in effect, a more sharply focused rule of reason
which, like all exceptions to the fundamental principles of the
2 33
Treaty, should be narrowly construed.
The Court manifests a prudential approach in crafting a
new market circumstances presumption that keeps with the nature of the evolution of Community law.23 4 It has been noted
that "the Community legal order is an emerging and developing
legal order in which a formally binding, rigid precedent of the
Court's case law would be hardly feasible. The stability of the
case law must be reconciled with the requirements of an emerging Community and the corresponding development of its
law."2 35 In fashioning this new presumption, the Court signals
that it is no longer willing to cobble together disparate cases in
236
search of a unifying principle.
Second, the Court's new presumption with respect to market circumstances in Keck 2 3 7 enhances the primary function of
the Court, to assure the uniform application and interpretation
228 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
229 BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 905 (6th ed. 1991). Res judicata is defined as a
matter that has been adjudicated.
230 Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. at 649.
231 See Norbert Reich, The November Revolution of the European Court: Keck
and Audi Revisited, (Feb. 1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
232 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
233 Id.
234 Id.
235 GERHARD BEBR, DEVELOPMENT OF JUDICIAL CONTROL OF THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITIES 12-13 (1981).
236
237

Keck & Mithouard,Joined Cases 267 & 268/91 at 236.
Keck & Mithouard,Joined Cases 267 & 268/91.
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239
of Community law by national courts. 23 8 According to Bebr,
the Court's central task is to ensure the rule of law, strengthen
the Community legal order, and promote its coherent
development.
Conflicting interpretations of Community law threaten the
coherent development of a Community legal order when they
spur waves of Article 177 challenges of dubious integrationist
worth. The absence of a coherent market circumstances doctrine240 in turn gives rise to even more meritless Article 177
claims. This haphazard jurisprudence threatens the very purpose of Article 177, which Bebr describes as, "[t]he indispensable guarantee for the very existence of the Community legal
241
order and its further development."
Although the Court does not present the final judgment in
a case when it exercises its authority to rule on points of Community law under Article 177, a robust and unfettered Article
177 is nevertheless essential to the development of the Community legal order. Moreover, the obligation of a national court of
last instance to refer is mandatory when a matter of interpretation arises. The Court has ruled that this obligation to refer is
absolute, with no exceptions, "[Tihe third paragraph of Article
177 unreservedly requires courts or tribunals of a Member
State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under
national law... to refer to the Court every question of interpre"242 Absent a determination by
tation raised before them ...
the Court that a matter does not offend a Treaty article and
need not be referred, the obligation to refer when a matter of
interpretation arises cannot be disregarded.
Article 177 has launched some of the most integrationist
concepts of Community law, including the doctrine of the
supremacy of Community law2 43 and the doctrine that elements
238 EC LEGISLATION (Nigel G. Foster ed., 4th ed., Blackstone Press 1993). According to Article 164, as amended by the Treaty on European Union, the Court
"shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is to
be observed."
239 BEBR, supra note 235, at 4.
240 BEBR,

supra note 235, at 7.

241 BEBR, supra note 235, at 7.

242 Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingadministratie, 1963
E.C.R. 31.
243 Case 6/64, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per L' Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964
E.C.R. 585.
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of Community law do not require implementing legislation to
24 4
have direct effect in the legal systems of Member States.
Mandatory Article 177 references from national courts comprise
about one half of the caseload of the Court in actions brought
under the Treaty.2 4 5 When meritless Article 177 claims clutter
the Court's calendar, the average period of time that a national
court must wait for the Court's judgment in a case that does
have substantial integrationist merit can be as long as a year
and a half.2 46 Delays of this magnitude impair justice and may,
at least in a de facto24 7 sense, limit the supremacy of Community law. 2 48
Also, the Court's decision in Keck 24 9 should be considered in
light of the rapid constitutional development that has occurred
within the Community. The European Court of Justice assumed a critical role in what Weiler terms the Foundational Period of the Community by proposing integrating legal rules in a
judicially driven constitutionalization process to compensate for
a disintegrating political framework. 25 0 During this period,
rampant "Euro-pessimism," spurred by widespread disagree244 Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.
245 Comm'n Report, XXIVth General Report on the Activities of the Communities 1990, 1991 EC Official Publications 449.
246 Id.
247 BLAC's LAw DICTIoNARY 287 (6th ed. 1991). De facto is a phrase used to
characterize a state of affairs which must be accepted for all practical purposes but
is really illegitimate or illegal.
248 In the landmark Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, the Court resolved an
issue fundamental to the legal role of the Community when the Court emphasized
the autonomy of Community authority and asserted the unlimited duration of the
Community itself. The case was based on an individual's claim in a local court
that the law nationalizing the production and distribution of electricity was incompatible with the Treaty. The local court referred several questions to the Court. In
its argument before the Court, the Italian Government claimed that the local
court's Article 177 request was inadmissible because the Italian court was only
entitled to apply Italy's nationalization law and not the law approving the Treaty,
since the latter law was approved earlier and was therefore subordinate to subsequent Italian legislation. The Italian Government's argument was based on a previous decision by the Italian Constitutional Court. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. at 585.
This case aroused great concern in the Community before it was resolved by the
Court. A delay of many months in resolving this critical issue might have encouraged other Member State action to qualify the supremacy of Community law,
attenuating and perhaps dooming integration.
249 Joined Cases 267 & 268/91, Republic of Fr. v. Bernard Keck & Daniel
Mithouard, (E.C.J. Nov. 24, 1993).
250 J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2426 (1991).
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ment about the velocity and ultimate aims of integration and
the parallel decline of the supranational features of Community
decision-making, lead ardent proponents of integration to conclude that complete constitutionalization was improbable.
Now, a revitalized constitutional structure has effectively
"locked" the Member States into a functioning, though not harmonious, collective decision-making forum. Astute political
leaders have long realized that a government that enjoys political legitimacy is one that will be able to economize on political
resources. There is no government, whether a unitary state or a
nascent federal coalition, that can afford to even appear ineffectual through the profligate allocation of decision-making
authority.
Clashing legal rules that turn on fact situations not easily
distinguished from one another may spark a lack of confidence
in the Community and its legal structure. The Court has affirmed in Van de Haar251 that there is no de minimis252 exception to Article 30.253 Even if the obstacle to intra-Community
trade is ephemeral and imported products can be marketed in
other ways, the offending legislation will still run afoul of the
omnibus Article 30. The removal of culturally and socially
driven market circumstances measures from the Article 30
calculus will afford a more rigorous analysis of whether a rule
affects intra-Community trade and what the constitutional basis of these rules should be.
Richard Chriss*

251 Case 177 & 178/82, Officer Van Justitie v. Jan Van de Haar & Aveka de
Meern B.V., 1984 E.C.R. 1797.
252 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 297 (6th ed. 1991). De minimis is defined as a
trifling matter.
253 Van de Haar, 1984 E.C.R. at 1797.
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